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SUCCESSOR EMPLO YERS

many possible avoidance schemes. The full impact may not be perfectly
clear until the lower courts begin to apply Byrum, but apparently Byrum
has created a substantial loophole in the estate tax field.
The Byrum decision creates a gross inequity in favor of a settlor
with substantial stock interest. It gives him control benefits that a settlor
with land or other types of property interests would not dream of retaining without fear of estate taxation. The Court has also gutted a major
portion of section 2036 with its interpretation of "right," which has
severely limited the scope of this section. However, the tax loophole
created gives Congress a compelling opportunity finally to clarify its
intention as to the scope of section 2036 after so many years of court
indecision and confusion. 72 If Congress accepts this opportunity, the tax
planner might finally be able to advise his client with some assurance
as to the effect of his transfer.
WILLIAM

L. TANKERSLEY III

Labor Law-The Obligations of a Successor Employer.
"In taking over a going concern or labor force, the labor title is to
be searched as diligently as the title to real property." ' A number of
labor disputes have arisen from uncertainty as to the obligations owed
by the acquiring company to the predecessor's union following the
merger with or acquisition of a unionized business. The recent Supreme
2
Court decision in NLRB v. Burns InternationalSecurity Services, Inc.
should dispel some of the confusion stemming from prior court and
National Labor Relations Board attempts to interpret the mandates of
the Labor Management Relations Act' (the Act) in regard to the labor
4
obligations of the successor employer.
Imposition of successorship status upon the acquiring corporation
2

Convey, Section 2036-The New Problem Child of the FederalEstate Tax, 4 TAX COUNSEL

Q. 121 (1960).
'Sangerman, The Labor Obligations of the Successor to a Unionized Business, 19 LAB. L.J.
160 (1968), quoting City Packing Corp. (1948) (no further citation given; probably an unpublished
arbitration decision).
292 S. Ct. 1571 (1972).
'Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act), 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-188 (1970).
'John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964), in which the Court reserved
decision on the question of survival of the previously negotiated collective bargaining agreement,
was used as the rationale for the Board's mistaken conclusion that the entire collective bargaining
agreement survived the change in ownership. The Board's order in the Burns case was a result of
its interpretation of the meaning of Wiley.
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enables the Board, or the Federal Courts as enforcers of the Board's
orders, to place certain obligations on the successor that would not be
required of a non-successor. The purpose of imposing these obligations
is to protect the predecessor's employees from the potentially harsh
effects of a change in ownership over which they have no control.'
Uncertainty over the obligations of a successor employer has been
due in part to the fact that the law of successorship is not governed
simply by the principles of contract and corporate law.' A collective
bargaining agreement is more than an ordinary contract as the Board
and the Supreme Court have established. 7 The status accorded to the
collective bargaining agreement has been used to justifying binding a
non-consenting successor employer to some of the obligations of a preexisting agreement in accordance with the "national labor policy" of
balancing the rights of employers to freely operate their businesses with
the desire to protect the employees from a "sudden change in the employment relationship." 8
Burns was low bidder for a contract to provide security service at
a Lockheed facility previously served by Wackenhut Corp., a competitor of Burns. Prior to the expiration of the contract between Wackenhut
and Lockheed, Wackenhut had entered into a collective bargaining
agreement with the United Plant Guards (UPG), a union which had
been certified as the exclusive bargaining agent of the Wackenhut employees after a Board-held election.
When Burns began providing services at the site, it did so with
knowledge of the previously existing agreement but without implicitly
or explicitly assuming any of Wackenhut's contractual obligations and
without obtaining any of Wackenhut's assets, physical or otherwise.
There was absolutely no privity of contract or other economic relationship between the two companies and no evidence upon which Burns
could be held to have assumed the collective bargaining agreement
which bound Wackenhut and UPG.9 Burns did, however, hire twentyseven former employees of Wackenhut and brought in fifteen of its own
employees from other sites in forming its labor force at Lockheed.
Although Burns knew of the certification of UPG, it refused to
bargain with the union, and the UPG filed an unfair labor practice
5

John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 548 (1964).
'Sangerman, supra note 1.
7John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 550 (1964); United Steelworkers v.
Warrior & Gulf Navig. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578 (1960).
'John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 549 (1964).
'92 S. Ct. at 1575.
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charge against Burns for refusing to bargain. 0 The trial examiner found
Burns guilty of refusing to bargain." The Board, in affirming, relied on

its interpretation of the Supreme Court's decision in John Wiley & Sons
v. Livingston 2 in holding that Burns was bound both to bargain with

the union and to honor the substantive terms
of the previously existing
3
agreement between Wackenhut and UPG.1

The Supreme Court in a five-four decision agreed that Burns was
obligated to bargain with UPG because Burns had "voluntarily [taken]
over a bargaining unit that was largely intact and that had been certified

within the past year."' 4 However, the Court unanimously reversed the
Board's order obligating Burns to the prior collective bargaining agree-

ment.' 5 The Court limited its earlier holding in Wiley in such a way as
to invalidate the implications which had been drawn from that decision

by the Board and by at least one lower court. 6
"The unfair labor practice charges alleged violations of the Labor Management Relations Act
(Taft-Hartley Act), §§ 8(a)(5), (1), 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(5), (1) (1970), which make it an unfair
labor practice for the employer to refuse to bargain collectively with the certified union. Additionally, the Board held that Burns had violated §§ 158(a)(2), (1)of the same Act by unlawfully
recognizing and assisting a rival union during the time in which it refused to bargain with UPG.
This finding was not challenged on appeal by Burns and was not part of the issue reviewed by the
Supreme Court. 92 S. Ct. at 1576.
"92 S. Ct. at 1576.
12376 U.S. 543 (1964).
"William J. Burns Int'l Detective Agency, Inc., 182 N.L.R.B. 348, 349 (1970). On appeal to
the Second Circuit, William J. Burns Int'l Detective Agency, Inc., v. NLRB, 441 F.2d 911 (2d
Cir. 1971), Burns challenged the finding of successorship and the order requiring it to honor the
prior agreement to which it was not a party. Burns also challenged the finding that the Lockheed
job site constituted an appropriate unit for collective bargaining purposes. Burns attempted to show
that its previous policy had been to deal with larger employee units due to its frequent shifting of
employees from site to site. Both the court of appeals and the Board found the Lockheed site to
be an appropriate unit and the Supreme Court did not consider this issue due to the limited grant
of certiorari. 92 S. Ct. at 1577.
"Id. at 1582.
1Id. The Court drew part of its interpretation of the policy embodied in the Act from H.K.
Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99 (1970), which did not deal with successorship but with the power
of the Board to force a certain provision upon an employer as a remedy for an unfair labor practice.
The Burns Court held that:
"[A]llowing the Board to compel agreement when the parties themselves are unable to
agree would violate the fundamental premise on which the Act is based-private bargaining under governmental supervision of the procedure alone ....
. . .The congressional policy manifest in the Act is to enable the parties to negotiate for any protection either deems appropriate, but to allow the balance of bargaining
advantage to be set by economic power realities. Strife is bound to occur if the concessions . . . do not correspond to the relative strength of the parties.
92 S. Ct. at 1582. See also NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 45 (1937).
"See Wackenhut Corp. v. Int'l Union of Plant Guards, 332 F.2d 954 (1964), in which the
Ninth Circuit held that Wiley could be construed as authority for holding that the successor
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In limiting Wiley, the Court pointed to the different procedural
contexts of the cases. Wiley arose from a suit under section 301 of the
Labor Management Relations Act 7 to compel arbitration, and Burns
arose from an unfair labor practice charge where the Board's power to
grant relief is limited by section 8(d) of the Act."s Further, Wiley could
have been decided on the basis of a state corporate merger law 9 that
imposed the obligations of the disappearing corporation on the surviving
corporation.
In Wiley, a smaller, unionized company was merged with a larger,
non-unionized corporation. The union brought a section 301 suit to
compel arbitration as to whether certain provisions of the prior agreement had survived the change in ownership because contractural disputes were subject to arbitration. The Supreme Court, without deciding
that successor employers are bound by the pre-existing agreement, held
that the surviving corporation was under a duty to arbitrate since the
merits of the dispute were subject to arbitration under the prior agreement. 0
The Board subsequently interpreted Wiley as holding that the entire collective bargaining agreement had survived the change in ownership. 2' The General Counsel then authorized the issuance of several
section 8(a)(5)22 complaints on the grounds that various successor employers had refused to recognize the pre-existing collective bargaining
agreement.2 Burns was a result.
The Burns Court emphatically disagreed with the Board's analysis
of Wiley, holding that "Wiley suggests no such open-ended obligation.
Its narrower holding dealt with a merger occurring against a background of state law which embodied the general rule that in merger
situations the surviving corporation is liable for the obligations of the
disappearing corporation. 21 4 The Court did, however, recognize that the
employer is bound to the prior collective bargaining agreement.
1729
U.S.C. § 301 (1970).

1"29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1970), which limits the Board's role in bargaining disputes to that of
supervising the procedure of collective bargaining without giving it authority to impose terms on
either party.
"See N.Y. STOCK CORP. LAW § 90 (McKinney 1951); W. FLETCHER, PRIVATE
CORPORATIONS § 7121 (rev. ed. 1961).
20376 U.S. at 549, 550.
2192

S. Ct. at 1581.

-29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1970).
2Gordon, Legal Questions of Successorship, 3 GA. L. REv. 280, 308 (1969), citing NLRB,
Report on Case Handling Developments, 58 L.R.R.M. 54, 57-58 (1965).
2192 S. Ct. at 1581.
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actions of a successor in insuring that a favorable collective bargaining
agreement would survive the acquisition might create, as a matter of
factual inference, an implied obligation to honor such an agreement. 5
Although the Court unanimously condemned the imposition of a
duty to honor an agreement not assented to, no consensus was reached
on the question of when successorship should be applied. A strong dissent by four Justices disagreed even with the finding that Burns was a
26
successor.
[Imposition of successorship] cannot logically be extended to a mere
naked shifting of a group of employees from one employer to another
without totally disregarding the basis for the doctrine. The notion of
a change in the "ownership or structure" of an enterprise connotes at
the very least that there is continuity in the enterprise, as well as
change; and that that continuity be at least in part on the employer's
2
side of the equation, rather than only on that of the employees. 1
The dissenters would impose successorship only when the alleged
successor had "succeeded to some of the tangible or intangible assets
by the use of which the employees might have expected the first employer to have performed his contract with them, ' 28 analogizing the
rights of employees to those accorded claimants who are protected from
2
loss due to a transfer of assets by the entity in which they have a claim. 1
Burns clearly affects the doctrine of successorship in three primary
ways. First, the duty to honor a predecessor's collective bargaining
agreement does not attach unless there is a voluntary or implied assumption of the agreement by the successor or unless the transfer of
ownership was made in bad faith to an alter ego company to escape
existing obligations. Secondly, the imposition of a duty to arbitrate the
extent to which the provisions of a pre-existing agreement survive a
merger or wholesale transfer of assets would appear to be limited to
situations conforming closely to Wiley. Thirdly, the future imposition
of successorship may well be influenced by some change in the perspective from which continuity of the operation is judged."
2Id.
at 1584.
26
1d. at 1586 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
'1d. at 1590-91 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
2Id. at 1591 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
"ld.
"Burns also dealt with the duty of a successor not to change unilaterally the existing terms
of a collective bargaining agreement. The Court held that Burns was not guilty of such a violation

because it was not bound by the Wackenhut-UPG agreement and thus could not be guilty of
changing terms when none existed. Id. at 1585. The Court indicated that a successor employer
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The Burns Court is justified in its unanimous disapproval of bindthe
successor to the entire collective bargaining agreement of its
ing
predecessor. Not only is the Burns result apparently compelled by inter-

pretation of the Act, 3' but the realities of commercial life dictate such
an approach. 32 To bind the successor to the prior agreement to which

he has not assented would restrict his opportunity to freely conduct his
business; indeed, the acquisition of any unionized business would become unattractive if such a rule were established, since the successor

would lose the power to determine one of his main operating factors,
the cost and conditions of his labor.
It is true that in many cases the existence of a collective bargaining
agreement embodying a favorable labor arrangement is a prime consideration in the decision to acquire a going concern. 33 It is also true that
the predecessor's employees deserve protection from a change in owner-

ship. However, to bind the successor to the prior agreement would
promote the kind of rigidity that restricts rather than encourages the
free flow of capital and the private ordering of labor agreements based
on economic realities. In many cases such an imposition would deprive
the union of an opportunity to seek even greater benefits from the

successor who is often more prosperous than the previous owner.3 4 The
best solution would appear to be one in which survival of the agreement
is determined by the mutual assent of the successor and the union rather
than solely by the successor employer or the Board.3" Consequently, it
would be generally free to specify the initial basis on which it intends to hire and that the bargaining
obligation-and thus the duty not to unilaterally change terms and conditions of employment-would arise only when the successor should know that the majority of his labor force are
the unionized
employees formerly employed by the predecessor. Id. at 1586.
31
See note 14 supra.
3
See Emerald Maintenance, Inc., 188 N.L.R.B. No. 139 (1971), in which the Board, after
its ruling in Burns, refused to bind a successor to the prior labor agreement because of an existing
policy of annual rebidding which produced yearly changes in contractual identity. Thus, to hold
the successor bound to the agreement would be to greatly circumscribe his ability to meet the yearly
changes in such a business situation. The Burns Court pointed to other dangers of binding the
successor, such as potential responsibility for past obligations owing under the agreement and the
fact that the successor might well have to consider the predecessor's employees as his own and
thus not be able to replace them with his own employees, although his motivation might be legal
under any interpretation of the Act. 92 S. Ct. at 1582-83. See id. at 1592 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting);
Rohlik, Inc., 145 N.L.R.B. 1236 (1964); and General Extrusion Co., 121 N.L.R.B. 1165 (1958),
for circumstances in which the Board refused to bind a successor to his predecessor's labor agreement.
1192 S. Ct. at 1584. By implication, an agreement that is favorable enough to honor can also
be construed as favorably influencing a decision to acquire in that the same attractive factors are
weighed in each circumstance.
3
"Id. at 1582.
3
'Gordon, supra note 23.
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would seem wise to include the union in negotiations leading to the
change in ownership.
Imposition of a duty to arbitrate upon the successor raises other
problems. Burns holds that the agreement does not survive a change in
ownership absent assumption in fact or in law by the successor, but
without a bargaining agreement, what is left to arbitrate? Wiley now
presents the paradoxical situation of a duty arising from the prior agreement, although the prior agreement does not survive. Burns thus limits
the situations in which arbitration is even a possibility. 6
There are far fewer theoretical problems raised by Burns holding
that the successor has a duty to bargain with the predecessor's union
when his labor force contains as a majority former employees of the
predecessor. Clearly, the preference of the employees concerning their
bargaining representative should be honored under the Act,37 which
requires employers to avoid coercive activity which would tend to restrict the free exercise of the employees' right to organize and to be
recognized.3 8 The duty to bargain, then, is but a theoretical extension
of the rights accorded employees by the Act:
The duty of an employer who has taken over an 'employing industry'
to honor the employees' choice of a bargaining agent is not one that
derives from a private contract, nor is it one that necessarily turns
upon the acquisition of assets or assumption of other obligations
usually incident to a sale, lease, or other arrangement between3 9employers. It is a public obligation arising by operation of the Act.
Burns clearly does nothing to change the status of this potential
obligation but is significant as an analysis of the threshold question
whether successorship and the duty to bargain should be imposed.
The Board has relied on factors relating to the degree of continuity
across the change in ownership in the "employing industry"4 0 while the
Court has enunciated a test of whether substantial continuity of identity
'The decision in Burns casts doubt that any analysis can henceforth be used to justify an
imposition of a duty based upon the survival, disguised as it may be, of the previous bargaining
agreement. Should such a decision be reached, however, the flexible approach set forth in United
Steelworkers v. Reliance Universal, Inc., 335 F.2d 891 (3d Cir. 1964), which requires the arbitrator
to "remake" the agreement considering any changed circumstances due to the transfer of ownership, is more in line with the Burns approach to successorship.
T
See Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970).
'Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 8(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1)

(1970).
"'Maintenance, Inc., 148 N.L.R.B. 1299, 1301 (1964).
"NLRB v. Auto Ventshade, Inc., 276 F.2d 303, 304 (5th Cir. 1960).
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in the enterprise exists before and after the change.4' Both tests examine
factors such as the following: whether the predecessor's work force is
retained, whether the same plant is used, whether the product or service
is similar, whether supervisory personnel are retained, whether the same
methods of operation are continued, and even whether the product name
remains the same. 42 The status and size difference between the predecessor and the successor can also be important: where the size difference
is great and the successor is himself unionized, there is a possibility that
the predecessor's employees may be held to have been "accreted" 42 into
the union of the larger successor.
The decision in Burns serves to emphasize the weight accorded to
retention by the successor of a predecessor's work force or enough of it
so that a majority of the successor's labor force is made up of the
predecessor's employees. The duty to bargain that arises from such
circumstances seems entirely in line with the theory that the doctrine of
successorship generally is a means of protecting the benefits won by the
employees' union from a change in ownership. 44 It seems that the legitimate expectation of the workers employed by the successor would be
that their elected and certified representatives would continue to be their
agents in dealings with management, especially when the tasks to be
performed are substantially the same, as they were in Burns.
Admittedly, the majority would justify a finding of successorship
in situations in which the continuity is solely on the employees' side of
the equation, for this was the situation in Burns. The dissent would
prohibit imposition of successorship unless continuity were found to
exist on both sides. The dissent said that to do more would be to exceed
the employees' legitimate expectations at the expense of the successor
who has not succeeded to any of the assets by the use of which the
predecessor would have honored those expectations. 5
This perspective-of-continuity analysis raises certain questions.
First, in view of the purpose of the doctrine of successorship to mitigate
the potentially harsh effects of a change in ownership, should continuity
(or privity) between employers be a consideration at all as long as the
tasks performed remain essentially the same? Secondly, if such continu4

John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 551 (1964).
Gordon, supra note 23, at 284; Sangerman, supra note 1, at 163.

2

43

"Accretion" is the effective integration of the predecessor's employees into the bargaining

unit of the successor employer. For an example of a successorship case involving accretion and
the duty to bargain, see McGuire v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 355 F.2d 352 (2d Cir. 1966).
4'John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964).
4192 S. Ct. at 1591 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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ity or privity becomes a requirement, could this not be supplied by
looking at the labor forces' trained presence as an intangible asset the
existence of which often positively influences the competitor to enter his
bid?
Certainly, there is ample support for the proposition that labor
force composition has and should continue to be the chief factor evaluated in deciding close questions of successorship.4 8 Analysis of the
grounds of decision in Burns, of Board decisions over a recent twenty
year span 4 7 and a holding of the Seventh Circuit" indicates that while
work force retention is often spoken of as evidence of requisite continuity, it may well be determinative in close cases in which other factors
point to differing results.
The effect of work force retention upon the ultimate decision in
successorship cases can be lessened by circumstances which alter the
context in which the successor will operate, such as the temporary nature of the enterprise," or where the successor evidences a totally different concept of operation." Clearly however, Burns does nothing to modify the existing illegality of discriminatory non-hiring of a predecessor's unionized employees. Should the successor decline to hire former
employees due to their union membership, he is still subject to an order
to bargain as well as an unfair labor practice charge."
Burns would appear to be more significant as a limiting of Wiley
and as a sensible approach to the balancing of employee protection with
free bargaining than as an enlightening new approach to the threshold
issue of whether successorship should be found. Elimination of the possibility of binding a successor to the pre-existing labor agreement which
the Board had interpreted to be within its power after Wiley is sound
in view of the policy of the Act and in light of the other obligations
4
See Goldberg, The Labor Law Obligationsof a SuccessorEmployer, 63 Nw. U.L. REv. 735
(1969); Gordon, supra note 23.
"See Goldberg, supra note 46, at 794, in which the author reported that in a twenty year period

from 1949 to 1969 the Board found successorship fifty-one times out of fifty-nine possibilities when
the successor had a work force composed of a majority of the predecessor's employees and found
successorship only twice (with one of these cases being reversed on appeal and later cited with
approval by the Board) when the alleged successor did not employ as a majority of his work force
employees of the predecessor.
'Tom-A-Hawk Transit, Inc. v. NLRB, 419 F.2d 1025 (7th Cir. 1969), a case involving almost
the same factual situation as Burns-successorship being found although there were no contractual

ties between the two companys on the basis of common labor force.
4

'Northwest Galvanizing Co., 168 N.L.R.B. 26 (1967).
"Retail Clerks Local 954 v. Lane's of Findlay, Inc., 260 F. Supp. 655 (N.D. Ohio 1966).
5
1K.B. & J. Young's Super Mkts., Inc. v. NLRB, 377 F.2d 463 (9th Cir. 1967).

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51

vesting in the successor which adequately protect the unionized employee. In many cases the successor will choose to assume the prior
collective bargaining agreement as a means of avoiding turmoil and to
insure that a favorable labor contract will continue.52 In other cases in
which this is not done, imposition of a duty to bargain seems a more
equitable method of assuring that present economic realities are the
basis of the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement than requiring the successor to honor an agreement to which he was not a
party. Industrial peace would be harshly achieved at the price of governmental ordering of both the procedure and substance of labor agreements.
The corporation contemplating acquisition of or merger with a
unionized company would be well advised to resolve all issues relating
to the former labor agreement before closing the transaction. The potential successor would do well, also, to include the union in the pretransfer negotiations should the union evidence an intention to try to
bind the successor to the pre-existing collective bargaining agreement.
Every reasonable attempt should be made to recognize and deal fairly
with the predecessor's union lest the transitional period between owners
lead to strikes and unfair labor practice charges brought before the
Board.
LUTHER PARKS COCHRANE

Property Law-The North Carolina Association of Realtors'
Contract of Sale
The North Carolina Association of Realtors' standard form contract of sale' or similar forms specify the legal rights and obligations of
most buyers and sellers of real estate in North Carolina. In a typical
transaction, a broker, as the agent of the seller, arranges the sale. When
a buyer decides to purchase, he ordinarily signs the form contract provided by the broker. Very few buyers or sellers in North Carolina see
an attorney before they have signed the contract of sale.2 Because of this
5292

S. Ct. at 1584.

'North Carolina Association of Realtors' Contract of Sale, standard form No. 8 (rev. 1967).
The contract is reprinted as an appendix to this note.
2
Given the importance of such a transaction, it is curious that parties usually do not seek legal
advice. This has been explained as a lack of legal sophistication of the public or a fear of onerous
legal fees. However, the fees for drafting or explaining a contract would probably be less than the

